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Abstract. We present three natural but distinct formalisations of Einstein’s special principle
of relativity, and demonstrate the relationships between them. In particular, we prove that they are
logically distinct, but that they can be made equivalent by introducing a small number of additional,
intuitively acceptable axioms.
§1. Introduction. The special principle of relativity (SPR), which states that the laws
of physics should be the same in all inertial frames, has been foundational to physical
thinking since the time of Galileo, and gained renewed prominence as Einstein’s first
postulate of relativity theory (Einstein, 1916, §1):
If a system of coordinates K is chosen so that, in relation to it, physical
laws hold good in their simplest form, the same laws hold good in rela-
tion to any other system of coordinates K’ moving in uniform translation
relatively to K. This postulate we call the “special principle of relativity.”
Despite its foundational status, the special principle of relativity remains problematic
due to its inherent ambiguity (Szabó, 2004; Gömöri & Szabó, 2013a,b). What, after all, do
we mean by “physical laws”, and what does it mean to say that the “same laws” hold in
two different frames?
These ambiguities often lead to misunderstandings and misinterpretations of the princi-
ple. See, e.g., Muller (1992) for the resolution of one such misinterpretation. We believe
that formalisation is the best way to eliminate these ambiguities. In this paper we investi-
gate the principle of relativity in an axiomatic framework of mathematical logic. However,
we will introduce not one but three different naturally arising versions of the principle of
relativity, not counting the parameters on which they depend, such as the formal language
of the framework used.
It is not so surprising, when one tries to capture SPR formally, that more than one
“natural” version offers itself – not only was Einstein’s description of his principle given
only informally, but its roots reach back to Galileo’s even less formal “ship story” (Galileo,
1953, pp. 186–187).
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Since all three of the versions we investigate are “natural”, and simply reflect different
approaches to capturing the original idea, there is no point trying to decide which is the
“authentic” formalisation. The best thing we can do is to investigate how the different
formalisations are related to each other. Therefore, in this paper we investigate under which
assumptions these formalisations become equivalent.
In a different framework but with similar motivations, Gömöri and Szabó also intro-
duce several formalisations of Einstein’s ideas (Szabó, 2004; Gömöri & Szabó, 2013a,b;
Gömöri, 2015). Intuitively, what they refer to as “covariance” corresponds to our principles
of relativity and what they call the principle of relativity is an even stronger assumption.
However, justifying this intuition is beyond the scope of this paper, as it would require us
to develop a joint framework in which both approaches can faithfully be interpreted.
1.1. Contribution. In this paper we present three logical interpretations (SPRM,
SPR+, and SPRB,IOb) of the relativity principle, and investigate the extent to which they
are equivalent. We find that the three formalisations are logically distinct, although they
can be rendered equivalent by the introduction of additional axioms. We prove rigorously
the following relationships.
1.1.1. Counter-examples and implications requiring no additional axioms (Fig. 1).
• SPR+ ⇒ SPRM (Theorem 7.1)
• SPRB,IOb ⇒ SPRM (Theorem 7.1)
• SPRB,IOb ⇒ SPR+ (Theorem 7.1)
• SPRM ⇒ SPR+ (Theorem 7.2)
• SPRM ⇒ SPRB,IOb (Theorem 7.3)
1.1.2. Adding axioms to make the different formalisations equivalent (Fig. 2).
• SPR+ ⇒ SPRB,IOb assuming AxId, AxEv, AxIB, AxField (Theorem 7.4)
• SPRB,IOb ⇒ SPRM assuming L = L0, AxEv, AxExt (Theorem 7.7)
• SPR+ ⇒ SPRM assuming L = L0, AxId, AxIB, AxField, AxEv, AxExt (The-
orems 7.4, 7.7)
• SPRB,IOb ⇒ SPR+ assuming L = L0, AxEv, AxExt (Theorems 7.2, 7.7)
Fig. 1. Counter-examples and implications requiring no additional axioms.
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Fig. 2. Axioms required to make the different formalisations equivalent.
1.1.3. SPRM, SPR+ and the decomposition of SPRB,IOb into SPRIOb and SPRB
(Fig. 3).
• SPR+ ⇒ SPRIOb assuming AxId, AxEv (Theorem 7.5)
• SPR+ ⇒ SPRB assuming AxIB, AxField (Theorem 7.6)
Outline of the paper. We begin in §2 by characterising what we mean by a “law of nature”
in our first-order logic framework. Rather than going into all the difficulties of defining
what a law of nature is, we focus instead on the requirement that all inertial observers
must agree as to the outcomes of experimental scenarios described by such a law. In §3
we give some examples, in §4 we demonstrate our three formalisations of SPR, in §5 we
discuss the types of models our language admits, and in §6 we state the axioms that will
be relevant to our results. These results are stated formally in §7. In §8 we discuss some
alternative assumptions to axiom AxIB. The proofs of the theorems can be found in §9.
Fig. 3. SPRM, SPR+ and the decomposition of SPRB,IOb into SPRIOb and SPRB.
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We conclude with a discussion of our findings in §10, where we also highlight questions
requiring further investigation.
§2. Laws of nature. Before turning our attention towards formalising the principle
of relativity, we need to present the framework in which our logical formalisms will be
expressed. Following the approach described in (Andréka, Madarász, & Németi, 2007;
Andréka, Madarász, Németi, & Székely, 2011), we will use the first-order logical (FOL)
3-sorted language
L0 = {IOb, B, Q, 0, 1,+, ·, W}
as a core language for kinematics. In this language
• IOb is the sort of inertial observers (for labeling coordinate systems);
• B is the sort of bodies, i.e., things that move;
• Q is the sort of quantities, i.e., numbers, with constants 0 and 1, addition (+) and
multiplication (·);
• W is the worldview relation, a 6-ary relation of type IOb × B × Q4.
The statement W(k, b, p) represents the idea that “inertial observer k coordinatises
body b to be at spacetime location p.”
Throughout this paper we use h, k and their variants to represent inertial observers
(variables of sort IOb); we use b and c to represent bodies (variables of sort B); and p,
q and r are variables of type Q4. The sorts of other variables will be clear from context.
Given this foundation, various derived notions can be defined:
• The event observed by k ∈ IOb as occurring at p ∈ Q4 is the set of bodies that k
coordinatises to be at p:
evk(p) ≡ {b ∈ B : W(k, b, p)}.
• For each k, h ∈ IOb, the worldview transformation wkh is a binary relation on
Q4 which captures the idea that h coordinatises at q ∈ Q4 the same event that k
coordinatises at p ∈ Q4:
wkh(p, q) ≡ [evk(p) = evh(q)]. (w.def)
• The worldline of b ∈ B as observed by k ∈ IOb is the set of locations p ∈ Q4 at
which k coordinatises b:
wlinek(b) ≡ {p : W(k, b, p)}.
We try to choose our primitive notions as simple and “observationally oriented” as
possible, cf. Friedman (1983, p. 31). Therefore the set of events is not primitive, but rather
a defined concept, i.e., an event is a set of bodies that an observer observes at a certain point
of its coordinate system. Motivation for such a definition of event goes back to Einstein and
can be found in Misner et al., (1973, p. 6) and Einstein (1996, p. 153).
Since laws of nature stand or fall according to the outcomes of physical experiments, we
next consider statements, φ, which describe experimental claims. For example, φ might say
“if this equipment has some specified configuration today, then it will have some expected
new configuration tomorrow”. This is very much a dynamic process-oriented description of
experimentation, but since we are using the language of spacetime, the entire experiment
can be described as a static four-dimensional configuration of matter in time and space.
We therefore introduce the concept of scenarios, i.e., sentences describing both the initial
conditions and the outcomes of experiments. Although our scenarios are primarily intended
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to capture experimental configurations and outcomes, they can also describe more complex
situations, as illustrated by the examples in §3. One of our formalisations of SPR will be
the assertion that all inertial observers agree as to whether or not certain situations are
realizable. Our definition of scenarios is motivated by the desire to have a suitably large set
of sentences describing these situations.
To introduce scenarios formally, let us fix a language L containing our core language
L0. We will say that a formula
φ ≡ φ(k, x¯) ≡ φ(k, x1, x2, x3, . . . )
of language L describes a scenario provided it has a single free variable k of sort IOb
(to allow us to evaluate the scenario for different observers), and none of sort B. The
other free variables x1, . . . can be thought of as experimental parameters, allowing us
to express such statements as φ(k, v) ≡ “k can see some body b moving with speed v”.
Notice that numerical variables (in this case v) can sensibly be included as free variables
here, but bodies cannot – if we allow the use of specific individuals (Thomas, say) we
can obtain formulae (“k can see Thomas moving with speed v”) which manifestly violate
SPR, since we cannot expect all observers k to agree on such an assertion. The truth values
of certain formulas containing bodies as free variables can happen to be independent of
inertial observers, for example ν2 in §3, but we prefer to treat these as exceptional cases to
be proven from the principle of relativity and the rest of the axioms.
Thus φ ≡ φ(k, x¯) represents a scenario provided
• k is free in φ(k, x¯),
• k is the only free variable of sort IOb,
• the free variables xi are of sort Q (or any other sort of L representing mathematical
objects), and
• there is no free variable of sort B (or any other sort of L representing physical
objects).
The set of all scenarios will be denoted by Scenarios.
Finally, for any formula φ(k, x¯) with free variables k of sort IOb and x1, x2, . . . of any
sorts, the formula
AllAgree〈φ〉 ≡ (∀k, h ∈ IOb)((∀x¯)[φ(k, x¯) ↔ φ(h, x¯)])
captures the idea that for every evaluation of the free variables x¯ all inertial observers
agree on the truth value of φ. Let us note that AllAgree〈〉 is defined not just for scenarios,
e.g., it is defined for the nonscenario examples of §3, too.
In §4, one of the formalisations of SPR will be that AllAgree〈φ〉 holds for every possible
scenario φ.
§3. Examples. Here we give examples for both scenarios and nonscenarios. To be able
to show interesting examples beyond the core language used in this paper, let us expand
our language with a unary relation Ph of light signals (photons) of type B and a function
M : B → Q for rest mass, i.e., M(b) is the rest mass of body b. For illustrative purposes
we focus in particular on inertial bodies, i.e., bodies moving with uniform linear motion,
and introduce the notations speedk(b) = v and velk(b) = (v1, v2, v3) to indicate that b
is an inertial body moving with speed v ∈ Q and velocity (v1, v2, v3) ∈ Q3 according
to inertial observer k. These notions can be easily defined assuming AxField introduced
in §6, and their definitions can be found, e.g., in Andréka, Madarász, Németi, & Székely
(2008), Madarász, Stannett, & Székely (2014).
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In the informal explanations of the examples below we freely use such modal expres-
sions as “can set down” and “can send out”, in place of “coordinatise”, to make the
experimental idea behind scenarios intuitively clearer, and to illustrate how the dynamical
aspects of making experiments are captured in our static framework. See also (Molnár &
Székely, 2015) for a framework where the distinction between actual and potential bodies
is elaborated within first-order modal logic.
Examples for scenarios:
• Inertial observer k can set down a body at spacetime location (0, 0, 0, 0):
φ1(k) ≡ (∃b)W(k, b, 0, 0, 0, 0).
• Inertial observer k can send out an inertial body with speed v :
φ2(k, v) ≡ (∃b)speedk(b) = v.
• Inertial observer k can send out an inertial body at location (x1, x2, x3, x4) with
velocity (v1, v2, v3) and rest mass m:
φ3(k, x1, x2, x3, x4, v1, v2, v3, m) ≡
(∃b)[W (k, b, x1, x2, x3, x4) ∧ velk(b) = (v1, v2, v3) ∧ M(b) = m].
• The speed of every light signal is v according to inertial observer k:
φ4(k, v) ≡ (∀b)[Ph(b) → speedk(b) = v].
Let us consider scenario φ4 to illustrate that AllAgree〈φ〉 means that all inertial obser-
vers agree on the truth value of φ for every evaluation of the free variables x¯ . Assume
that the speed of light is 1 for every inertial observer, i.e., that (∀k)(∀b)[Ph(b) →
speedk(b) = 1] ∧ (∃b)Ph(b) holds. Then the truth value of φ4(k, 1) is true for every
inertial observer k, but the truth value of φ4(k, a) is false for every inertial observer k if
a = 1. Thus AllAgree〈φ4〉 holds.
Examples for nonscenarios:
• The speed of inertial body b according to inertial observer k is v :
ν1(k, v, b) ≡ speedk(b) = v.
Then AllAgree〈ν1〉 means that all inertial observers agree on the speed of each body.
Obviously, we do not want such statements to hold.
Notice, incidentally, that it is possible for all observers to agree as to the truth value of
a nonscenario, but this is generally something we need to prove, rather than assert a priori.
For example, consider the nonscenario:
• The speed of light signal b is v according to inertial observer k:
ν2(k, v, b) ≡ Ph(b) → speedk(b) = v.
Then AllAgree〈ν2〉 means that all inertial observers agree on the speed of each light
signal, and it happens to follow from AllAgree〈φ4〉, where scenario φ4 is given above.
Therefore, AllAgree〈ν2〉 will follow from our formalisations of SPR which entail the truth
of formula AllAgree〈φ4〉.
While different observers agree on the speed of any given photon in special relativity
theory, they do not agree as to its direction of motion, which is captured by the following
nonscenario:
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• The velocity of light signal b is (v1, v2, v3) according to inertial observer k:
ν3(k, v1, v2, v3, b) ≡ Ph(b) → velk(b) = (v1, v2, v3).
Then AllAgree〈ν3〉 means that all inertial observers agree on the velocity of each light
signal, and once again we do not want such a formula to hold.
§4. Three formalisations of SPR.
4.1. First formalisation. A natural interpretation of the special principle is to identify
a set S of scenarios on which all inertial observers should agree (i.e., those scenarios we
consider to be experimentally relevant). If we now define
SPR(S) ≡ {AllAgree〈φ〉 : φ ∈ S}, (1.S)
the principle of relativity becomes the statement that every formula in SPR(S) holds. For
example, if we assume that all inertial observers agree on all scenarios, and define
SPR+ ≡ {AllAgree〈φ〉 : φ ∈ Scenarios}, (1.+)
then we get a “strongest possible” version of SPR(S) formulated in the language L.
It is important to note that the power of SPR(S) (and hence that of SPR+) strongly
depends on which languageLwe use. It matters, for example, whether we can only useL to
express scenarios related to kinematics, or whether we can also discuss particle dynamics,
electrodynamics, etc. The more expressive L is, the stronger the corresponding principle
becomes.
4.2. Second formalisation. A natural indirect approach is to assume that the world-
views of any two inertial observers are identical. In other words, given any model M of
our language L, and given any observers k and h, we can find an automorphism of the
model which maps k to h, while leaving all quantities (and elements of all the other sorts
of L representing mathematical objects) fixed. That is, if the only sort of L representing
mathematical objects is Q, we require the statement
SPRM ≡ (∀k, h ∈ IOb)(∃α ∈ Aut (M))[α(k) = h ∧ αQ = I dQ] (2)
to hold, where I dQ is the identity function on Q, and αQ denotes the restriction of α to
the quantity part of the model. If L has other sorts representing mathematical objects than
Q, then in (2) we also require αU = I dU to hold for any such sort U .
4.3. Third formalisation. Another way to characterise the special principle of relativ-
ity is to assume that all inertial observers agree as to how they stand in relation to bodies
and each other (see Fig. 4). In other words, we require the formulae
SPRB ≡ (∀k, k′)(∀b)(∃b′)[wlinek(b) = wlinek′(b′)] (3.B)
and
SPRIOb ≡ (∀k, k′)(∀h)(∃h′)[wkh = wk′h′] (3.IOb)
to be satisfied. We will use the following notation:
SPRB,IOb = {SPRB, SPRIOb}.
SPRB,IOb is only a “tiny kinematic slice” of SPR. It says that two inertial observers are
indistinguishable by possible world lines and by their relation to other observers.
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Fig. 4. Illustration for SPRB and SPRIOb.
§5. Models satisfying SPR. According to Theorems 7.2 and 7.3 below, SPRM is the
strongest of our three formalisations of the relativity principle, since it implies the other
two without any need for further assumptions.
The ‘standard’ model of special relativity satisfies SPRM and therefore also SPR+ and
SPRB,IOb, where by the ‘standard’ model we mean a model determined up to isomor-
phisms by the following properties: (a) the structure of quantities is isomorphic to that of
real numbers; (b) all the worldview transformations are Poincaré transformations; (c) for
every inertial observer k and Poincaré transformation P , there is another observer h, such
that wkh = P; (d) bodies can move exactly on the smooth timelike and lightlike curves;
and (e) worldlines uniquely determine bodies and worldviews uniquely determine inertial
observers.
In fact, there are several models satisfying SPRM in the literature, and these models
also ensure that the axioms used in this paper are mutually consistent. Indeed, in (Székely,
2013; Andréka, Madarász, Németi, Stannett, & Székely, 2014; Madarász & Székely, 2014)
we have demonstrated several extensions of the ‘standard’ model of special relativity which
satisfy SPRM. Applying the methods used in those papers, it is not difficult to show
that SPRM is also consistent with classical kinematics. Again, this is not surprising as
there are several papers in the literature showing that certain formalisations of the prin-
ciple of relativity cannot distinguish between classical and relativistic kinematics, and as
Ignatowski (1910, 1911) has shown, when taken together with other assumptions, SPR
implies that the group of transformations between inertial observers can only be the
Poincaré group or the inhomogeneous Galilean group. For further developments of this
theme, see (Lévy-Leblond, 1976; Borisov, 1978; Pal, 2003; Pelissetto & Testa, 2015).
The simplest way to get to special relativity from SPRM is to extend the language
L0 with light signals and assume Einstein’s light postulate, i.e., light signals move with
the same speed in every direction with respect to at least one inertial observer. Then, by
SPRM, AxPh follows, i.e., light signals move with the same speed in every direction
according to every inertial observer. AxPh, even without any principle of relativity, implies
(using only some trivial auxiliary assumptions such as AxEv (see p. 9)), that the transfor-
mations between inertial observers are Poincaré transformations; see, e.g., (Andréka et al.,
2011, Theorem 2.2).
It is worth noting that SPRM also admits models which extend the ‘standard’ model of
special relativity, for example models containing faster-than-light bodies which can interact
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dynamically with one another (Székely, 2013; Andréka et al., 2014; Madarász & Székely,
2014).
§6. Axioms. We now define various auxiliary axioms. As we show below, whether or
not two formalisations of SPR are equivalent depends to some extent on which of these
axioms one considers to be valid.
In these axioms, the spacetime origin is the point e0 = (0, 0, 0, 0), and the unit points
along each axis are defined by e1 = (1, 0, 0, 0), e2 = (0, 1, 0, 0), e3 = (0, 0, 1, 0), and
e4 = (0, 0, 0, 1). We call e0, . . . , e4 the principal locations.
AxEv All observers agree as to what can be observed. If k can observe an event some-
where, then h must also be able to observe that event somewhere:
(∀k, h)(∀p)(∃q)[evk(p) = evh(q)].
AxId If k and h agree as to what’s happening at each of the 5 principal locations, then
they agree as to what’s happening everywhere (see Fig. 5):
(∀k, h)((∀i ∈ {0, . . . , 4})[evk(ei ) = evh(ei )] → (∀p)[evk(p) = evh(p)]
)
.
We can think of this axiom as a generalised form of the assertion that all worldview
transformations are affine transformations.
AxExtIOb If two inertial observers coordinatise exactly the same events at every possible
location, they are actually the same observer:
(∀k, h)((∀p)[evk(p) = evh(p)] → k = h
)
.
AxExtB If two bodies have the same worldline (as observed by any observer k), then they
are actually the same body:
(∀k)(∀b, b′)[wlinek(b) = wlinek(b′) → b = b′].
AxExt We write this as shorthand for AxExtB ∧ AxExtIOb.
AxField (Q, 0, 1,+, ·) satisfies the most fundamental properties of R, i.e., it is a field
(in the sense of abstract algebra; see, e.g., (Stewart, 2009)).
Notice that we do not assume a priori that Q is the field R of real numbers, because we
do not know and cannot determine experimentally whether the structure of quantities in the
real world is isomorphic to that of R. Moreover, using arbitrary fields makes our findings
more general.
AxIB All bodies (considered) are inertial, i.e., their worldlines are straight lines according
to every inertial observer:
(∀k)(∀b)(∃p, q)[q = e0 ∧ wlinek(b) = {p + λq : λ ∈ Q}].
Fig. 5. Schematic representation of AxId: If k and h agree as to what’s happening at each of the
5 principal locations, then they agree as to what’s happening at every location p.
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AxIB is a strong assumption. In §8, we introduce generalisations of AxIB allowing
accelerated bodies, too. We choose to include AxIB in our main theorems because it
is arguably the simplest and clearest of these generalisations. The main generalisation
wlDefM of AxIB is a meta-assumption and the others are quite technical assertions which
are easier to understand in relation to AxIB.
§7. Results. IfM is some model for a FOL language L, and  is some collection of
logical formulae in that language, we write M   to mean that every σ ∈  is valid
when interpreted withinM. If 1, 2 are both collections of formulae, we write 1  2
to mean that
M  2 whenever M  1
holds for every model M of L. For a general introduction to logical models, see
(Mendelson, 2015; Marker, 2002).
Theorem 7.1 demonstrates that our three formalisations of the principle of relativity are
logically distinct. It is worth noting that based on the ideas used in the proof of Theorem 7.1
it is also easy to construct sophisticated counterexamples to their equivalence extending the
‘standard’ model of special relativity.
THEOREM 7.1. The formalisations SPRM, SPR+, and SPRB,IOb are logically distinct:
• M  SPR+ ⇒ SPRM.
• M  SPRB,IOb ⇒ SPRM.
• M  SPRB,IOb ⇒ M  SPR+.
By Theorems 7.2 and 7.3, SPRM is the strongest version of the three formalisations
since it implies the other two without any extra assumptions.
THEOREM 7.2. SPRM ⇒M  SPR+.
THEOREM 7.3. SPRM ⇒M  SPRB,IOb.
Theorem 7.4 tells us that SPR+ can be made as powerful as SPRB,IOb by adding
additional axioms. This is an immediate consequence of Theorems 7.5 and 7.6.
THEOREM 7.4. SPR+ ∪ {AxId, AxEv, AxIB, AxField}  SPRB,IOb.
THEOREM 7.5. There exist scenarios ψ, ψ˜ such that SPR(ψ, ψ˜) ∪ {AxId, AxEv} 
SPRIOb.
THEOREM 7.6. There exists a scenario ξ such that SPR(ξ) ∪ {AxIB, AxField}  SPRB.
Theorem 7.7 tells us that equipping SPRB,IOb with additional axioms allows us to
recapture the power of SPRM (and hence, by Theorem 7.2, SPR+).
THEOREM 7.7. Assume L = L0. ThenM  SPRB,IOb ∪ {AxEv, AxExt} ⇒ SPRM.
Thus, although SPRM, SPRB,IOb, and SPR+ are logically distinct, they become equiv-
alent in the presence of suitable auxiliary axioms.
§8. Alternatives to AxIB. In this section, we generalise AxIB to allow discussion of
accelerated bodies.
For every modelM we formulate a property which says that world lines are paramet-
rically definable subsets of Q4, where the parameters can be chosen only from Q. For the
definitions, cf. (Marker, 2002, §1.1.6, §1.2.1).
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wlDefM For any k ∈ IOb and b ∈ B there is a formula ϕ(y1, y2, y3, y4, x1, . . . , xn),
where all the free variables y1, y2, y3, y4, x1, . . . , xn of ϕ are of sort Q, and there is
a¯ ∈ Qn such that wlinek(b) ≡ {q ∈ Q4 :M  ϕ(q, a¯)}.
We note that plenty of curves in Q4 are definable in the sense above, e.g., curves which
can be defined by polynomial functions, as well as the worldlines of uniformly accelerated
bodies in both special relativity and Newtonian kinematics.
In general, not every accelerated worldline is definable – indeed, the set of curves which
are definable depends both on the language and the model. For example, uniform circular
motion is undefinable in many models; however, if we extend the language with the sine
function as a primitive notion and assert its basic properties by including the appropriate
axioms, then uniform circular motion becomes definable.
By Theorems 8.1 and 8.2, assumptions AxIB and AxField can be replaced by wlDefM
in Theorem 7.4 (Theorem 8.2 follows immediately from Theorems 7.5 and 8.1).
THEOREM 8.1. (wlDefM andM  SPR+) ⇒ M  SPRB.
THEOREM 8.2. (wlDefM andM  SPR+ ∪ {AxId, AxEv}) ⇒M  SPRB,IOb.
We note thatM  {AxIB, AxField} ⇒ wlDefM. Moreover wlDefM is more general
than AxIB assuming AxField. The disadvantage of wlDefM is that it is not an axiom, but
a property of modelM. We now introduce, for every natural number n, an axiom AxWl(n)
which is more general than AxIB assuming AxField and n ≥ 3, and stronger than wlDefM.
AxWl(n) Worldlines are determined by n distinct locations, i.e., if two worldlines agree
at n distinct locations, then they coincide:
(∀k, k′)(∀b, b′)
[(∃ distinct p1, . . . , pn ∈ wlinek(b) ∩ wlinek′(b′)) → wlinek(b) = wlinek′(b′)].
We note that {AxIB, AxField}  AxWl(2), and AxWl(n)  AxWl(i) if i ≥ n.
Furthermore, for every n, we haveM  AxWl(n) ⇒ wlDefM. To see that this must
be true, assumeM  AxWl(n), choose k ∈ IOb and b ∈ B, let p1, . . . , pn ∈ wlinek(b) be
distinct locations, and define
ϕ(y1, y2, y3, y4, x11 , x
1
2 , x
1
3 , x
1
4 , . . . , x
n
1 , x
n
2 , x
n
3 , x
n
4 ) ≡
(∃h)(∃c)[(y1, y2, y3, y4), (x11 , x12 , x13 , x14), . . . , (xn1 , xn2 , xn3 , xn4 ) ∈ wlineh(c)].
Then it is easy to see that wlinek(b) ≡ {q ∈ Q4 : M  ϕ(q, p1, . . . , pn)}, whence
wlDefM holds, as claimed.
By Theorems 8.3 and 8.4, Theorems 7.4 and 7.6 remain true if we replace AxIB and
AxField with AxWl(n).
THEOREM 8.3. SPR+ ∪ {AxId, AxEv, AxWl(n)}  SPRB,IOb.
THEOREM 8.4. There is a scenario ξ such that SPR(ξ) ∪ {AxWl(n)}  SPRB.
§9. Proofs. We begin by proving a simple lemma which allows us to identify when two
observers are in fact the same observer. This lemma will prove useful in several places below.
LEMMA 9.1. {AxEv, AxExtIOb}  (∀k, h, h′)[(wkh = wkh′) → h = h′].
Proof. Suppose wkh = wkh′ , and choose any p ∈ Q4. Let q ∈ Q4 satisfy evk(q) =
evh(p), so that wkh(q, p) holds (q exists by AxEv). Since wkh = wkh′ , it follows that
wkh′(q, p) also holds, so that evh(p) = evk(q) = evh′(p). This shows that h and
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12 JUDIT X. MADARÁSZ ET AL.
h′ see the same events at every p ∈ Q4, whence it follows by AxExtIOb that h = h′,
as claimed. 
Proof of Theorem 7.1. SPR+ ⇒ SPRM, SPRB,IOb ⇒ SPRM, SPRB,IOb ⇒
SPR+.
Constructing the required counterexamples in detail from scratch would be too lengthy
and technical, and would obscure the key ideas explaining why such models exist. Accord-
ingly, here we give only the ‘recipes’ on how to construct these models.
To prove that SPR+ does not imply SPRM, letM− be any model satisfying SPRM−
and AxExt, and containing at least two inertial observers and a body b such that the world-
lines of b are distinct according to the two observers. Such models exist, see, e.g., the ones
constructed in Székely (2013). The use of AxExt ensures that distinct bodies have distinct
worldlines. Let us now construct an extension M of M− (violating AxExt) by adding
uncountably-infinite many copies of body b, as well as countably-infinite many copies of
every other body. Clearly, M does not satisfy SPRM, since this would require the exis-
tence of an automorphism taking a body having uncountably many copies to one having
only countably many copies. Nonetheless,M satisfies SPR+ since it can be elementarily
extended to an even larger model M+ satisfying SPRM+ (and hence, by Theorem 7.2,
SPR+) by increasing the population of other bodies so that every body has an equal
(uncountable) number of copies (see (Madarász, 2002, Theorem 2.8.20)). Thus M sat-
isfies SPR+ but not SPRM. In more detail: Let M+ be an extension of M obtained
by increasing the population of bodies so that every body has an equal (uncountable)
number of copies. We will use the Tarski–Vaught test (Marker, 2002, Prop. 2.3.5, p. 45) to
show thatM+ is an elementary extension ofM. Let φ(v,w1, . . . , wn) be a formula and
suppose a1, . . . , an in M and d+ in M+ satisfy M+  φ(d+, a1, . . . , an). We have to
find a d inM such thatM+  φ(d, a1, . . . , an). If d+ is not a body, then d+ is already
in M since we extended M only by bodies. Assume, then, that d+ is a body. Then d+
has infinitely many copies in M, so we can choose d, a copy of d+ in M, such that
d ∈ {a1, . . . , an}. Let α be any automorphism ofM+ which interchanges d and d+ and
leaves every other element fixed. Then α(a1) = a1, . . . , α(an) = an and α(d+) = d.
By M+  φ(d+, a1, . . . , an), we have that M+  φ(α(d+), α(a1), . . . , α(an)). Thus
M+  φ(d, a1, . . . , an) as required.
To prove that SPRB,IOb does not imply SPRM or SPR+, let M be any model of
SPRB,IOb and AxExt containing at least two inertial observers k and h and a body b
for which wlinek(b) = {(0, 0, 0, t) : t ∈ Q} = wlineh(b). Such models exist, see,
e.g., (Székely, 2013). Duplicating body b leads to a model in which SPRB,IOb is still
satisfied since duplicating a body does not change the possible worldlines but it vio-
lates both SPRM (the automorphism taking one inertial observer to another cannot take
a body having only one copy to one having two) and SPR+ (since scenario ϕ(m) ≡
(∀b, c)[wlinem(b) = wlinem(c) = {(0, 0, 0, t) : t ∈ Q} → b = c] holds for h but does not
hold for k). 
Proof of Theorem 7.2. SPRM ⇒M  SPR+.
Suppose SPRM, so that for any observers k and h there is an automorphism α ∈
Aut (M) such that α(k) = h and α leaves elements of all sorts of L representing math-
ematical objects fixed.
We will prove that AllAgree〈φ〉 holds for all φ ∈ Scenarios, i.e., given any observers
k and h, any scenario φ, and any set x¯ of parameters for φ, we have
φ(k, x¯) ↔ φ(h, x¯). (1)
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To prove this, choose some α ∈ Aut (M) which fixes Q and all the other sorts
representing mathematical objects, and satisfies α(k) = h.
Suppose M  φ(k, x¯). Since α is an automorphism, φ(α(k), α(x¯)) also holds in M.
But α(k) = h and α(x¯) = x¯ , so this says thatM  φ(h, x¯). Conversely, if φ(h, x¯) holds
inM, then so does φ(k, x¯), by symmetry. 
Proof of Theorem 7.3. SPRM ⇒M  SPRB,IOb.
Suppose SPRM. Then (∀k, h)(∃α ∈ Aut (M))[α(k) = h ∧ αQ = I dQ]. We wish to
prove thatM satisfies
SPRIOb ≡ (∀k, k′)(∀h)(∃h′)[wkh = wk′h′],
SPRB ≡ (∀k, k′)(∀b)(∃b′)[wlinek(b) = wlinek′(b′)].
Recall that whenever α is an automorphism ofM and R is a defined n-ary relation onM,
we have
R(v1, . . . , vn) ⇐⇒ R(α(v1), . . . , α(vn)). (2)
Proof of SPRIOb. Choose any k, k′, h. We need to find h′ such that wkh = wk′h′ , so let
α ∈ Aut (M) be some automorphism taking k to k′, and define h′ = α(h). Now it’s enough
to note that wkh(p, q) is a defined 10-ary relation onM (one parameter each for k and h,
4 each for p and q), so that
wkh(p, q) ⇐⇒ wα(k)α(h)(α(p), α(q))
holds for all p, q, by (2). Substituting α(k) = k′, α(h) = h′, and noting that α leaves all
spacetime coordinates fixed (because αQ = I dQ) now gives
wkh(p, q) ⇐⇒ wk′h′(p, q)
as required.
Proof of SPRB. Choose any k, k′ and b. We need to find b′ such that wlinek(b) =
wlinek′(b′). As before, let α ∈ Aut (M) be some automorphism taking k to k′, define
b′ = α(b), and note that “p ∈ wlinek(b)” is a defined 6-ary relation onM. Applying (2)
now tells us that
wlinek(b) = wlineα(k)(α(b)) = wlinek′(b′)
as required. 
Proof of Theorem 7.4. SPR+ ∪ {AxId, AxEv, AxIB, AxField}  SPRB,IOb.
This is an immediate consequence of Theorems 7.5 and 7.6. 
Proof of Theorem 7.5. SPR(ψ, ψ˜) ∪ {AxId, AxEv}  SPRIOb for some ψ, ψ˜ .
Given a 5-tuple of locations xi = (x0, x1, x2, x3, x4), let match (see Fig. 6) be the
relation
match(h, k, xi ) ≡ (∀i ∈ {0, . . . , 4})(evh(ei ) = evk(xi ))
and define ψ, ψ˜ ∈ Scenarios by
ψ(k, p, q, xi ) ≡ (∃h)[(evh(p) = evk(q)) ∧ match(h, k, xi )],
ψ˜(k, p, q, xi ) ≡ (∃h)[(evh(p) = evk(q)) ∧ match(h, k, xi )].
Choose any k, h, k′. In order to establish SPRIOb we need to demonstrate some h′ such
that wkh = wk′h′ . To do this, let xi be such that evk(xi ) = evh(ei ) for all i = 0, . . . , 4
(these exist by AxEv).
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Fig. 6. Schematic showing the behaviour of function match, which tells us which locations in k’s
worldview correspond to the principle locations in h’s worldview.
Then, in particular, ψ(k, e0, x0, xi ) ≡ (∃h)[(evh(e0) = evk(x0)) ∧ match(h, k, xi )]
holds. Since SPR(ψ, ψ˜), it follows that ψ(k′, e0, x0, xi ) also holds, so there is some h′
satisfying
match(h′, k′, xi ). (3)
Now choose any p and q. We will show that evh(p) = evk(q) if and only if evh′(p) =
evk′(q), whence wkh = wk′h′ , as claimed.
Case 1. Suppose evh(p) = evk(q). In this case, ψ(k, p, q, xi ) holds, and we need to
prove that evh′(p) = evk′(q). It follows from SPR(ψ, ψ˜) that ψ(k′, p, q, xi ) also holds,
i.e., there exists h′′ satisfying
(evh′′(p) = evk′(q)) ∧ match(h′′, k′, xi ). (4)
It follows from (3) that
match(h′, k′, xi ) ∧ match(h′′, k′, xi )
holds, i.e.,
evh′(ei ) = evk′(xi ) = evh′′(ei )
holds for all i = 0, . . . , 4. By AxId it follows that (∀r)(evh′(r) = evh′′(r)).
It now follows from (4) that
evh′(p) = evh′′(p) = evk′(q),
i.e., evh′(p) = evk′(q), as required.
Case 2. Suppose evh(p) = evk(q). In this case, ψ˜(k, p, q, xi ) holds, and we need to
prove that evh′(p) = evk′(q). It follows from SPR(ψ, ψ˜) that ψ˜(k′, p, q, xi ) also holds,
i.e., there exists h′′ satisfying
(evh′′(p) = evk′(q)) ∧ match(h′′, k′, xi ). (5)
As before, it follows from (3) that evh′(ei ) = evk′(xi ) = evh′′(ei ) holds for all i =
0, . . . , 4, and hence by AxId that (∀r)(evh′(r) = evh′′(r)).
It now follows from (5) that
evh′(p) = evh′′(p) = evk′(q),
i.e., evh′(p) = evk′(q), as required. 
Proof of Theorem 7.6. SPR(ξ) ∪ {AxIB, AxField}  SPRB for some ξ .
We define ξ ∈ Scenarios by ξ(k, p, q) ≡ (∃b)(p, q ∈ wlinek(b)).
To see that this satisfies the theorem, suppose that AxIB and AxField both hold, and
choose any k, k′ ∈ IOb and any b ∈ B. We will demonstrate a body b′ satisfying
wlinek(b) = wlinek′(b′), whence SPRB holds, as claimed.
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According to AxIB, there exist points pk, qk ∈ Q4, where qk = e0, and
wlinek(b) = {pk + λqk : λ ∈ Q}.
In particular, therefore, the points p = pk and q = pk + qk are distinct elements of the
straight line wlinek(b).
This choice of p and q ensures that the statement ξ(k, p, q) holds. By SPR(ξ), it follows
that ξ(k′, p, q) also holds; i.e., there is some body b′ such that p, q ∈ wlinek′(b′). By AxIB,
wlinek′(b′) is also a straight line.
It follows that wlinek(b) and wlinek′(b′) are both straight lines containing the same two
distinct points p and q. Since there can be at most one such line (by AxField) it follows
that wlinek(b) = wlinek′(b′), as claimed. 
Proof of Theorem 7.7. If L = L0, thenM  SPRB,IOb ∪{AxEv, AxExt} ⇒ SPRM.
Choose any k, k′. We need to demonstrate an automorphism α ∈ Aut (M) which is the
identity on Q and satisfies α(k) = k′.
• Action of α on IOb: Suppose h ∈ IOb. According to SPRIOb, there exists some h′
such that wkh = wk′h′ . By Lemma 9.1, this h′ is uniquely defined (since we would
otherwise have distinct h′, h′′ satisfying wk′h′ = wk′h′′). Define α(h) = h′.
• Action of α on B: Suppose b ∈ B. According to SPRB, there exists some b′ such that
wlinek(b) = wlinek′(b′). By AxExtB, this b′ is uniquely defined. Define α(b) = b′.
• Action on Q: Define αQ = I dQ . Notice that this forces α(p) = p for all p ∈ Q4.
We already know that α fixes Q. It remains only to prove that α ∈ Aut (M), and that
α(k) = k′.
Proof that α(k) = k′: Recall first that for any equivalence relation R, it is the case that
R = R ◦ R−1, and that given any k, k′, k′′, we have
• wkk is an equivalence relation;
• w−1kk′ = wk′k ; and• wkk′ ◦ wk′k′′ = wkk′′ (by AxEv and (w.def)).
By construction, we have wkk = wk′α(k), whence wk′α(k) is an equivalence relation.
It now follows that
wk′α(k) = wk′α(k) ◦ w−1k′α(k)
= wk′α(k) ◦ wα(k)k′
= wk′k′
and hence, by Lemma 9.1, that α(k) = k′, as required.
Proof that α ∈ Aut (M): We know that wlinek(b) = wlinek′(α(b)) = wlineα(k)(α(b)),
or in other words, given any b and q ∈ Q4,
b ∈ evk(q) ⇐⇒ α(b) ∈ evα(k)(q). (6)
We wish to prove W(h, b, p) ↔ W(α(h), α(b), p) for all h, b and p (recall that
α(p) = p). This is equivalent to proving
b ∈ evh(p) ⇐⇒ α(b) ∈ evα(h)(p). (7)
Choose any h, b, p. Let q ∈ Q4 satisfy evk(q) = evh(p) – such a q exists by AxEv. Then
evα(k)(q) = evα(h)(p) (8)
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because wkh = wk′α(h) = wα(k)α(h) by the definition of α(h) and the fact, established
above, that k′ = α(k).
To prove (7), let us first assume that b ∈ evh(p). Then b ∈ evk(q), so α(b) ∈ evα(k)(q)
by (6). Then, by (8) we have α(b) ∈ evα(h)(p). Next, choose b ∈ evh(p) = evk(q). Then
α(b) ∈ evα(k)(q) = evα(h)(p) by (6) and (8). It follows that b ∈ evh(p) ⇐⇒ α(b) ∈
evα(k)(q), as required.
It remains to show that α is a bijection.
Proof of injection:
• Observers: Suppose α(h) = α(h′). Then, by the definition of α, we have
wkh = wk′α(h) = wk′α(h′) = wkh′
and now h = h′ by Lemma 9.1.
• Bodies: Suppose α(b) = α(c). By definition of α we have
wlinek(b) = wlinek′(α(b)) = wlinek′(α(c)) = wlinek(c)
and now b = c follows by AxExtB.
Proof of surjection: We need for every h′, b′ that there are h, b satisfying α(h) = h′ and
α(b) = b′.
• Observers: Let h′ ∈ IOb. By SPRIOb there exists h such that wk′h′ = wkh , and
now h′ = α(h) for any such h.
• Bodies: Let b′ ∈ B. By SPRB there exists b ∈ B such that wlinek′(b′) = wlinek(b),
and now b′ = α(b) for any such b.
This completes the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 8.1. (wlDefM andM  SPR+) ⇒ M  SPRB.
Assume M  SPR+ and wlDefM. Choose any k, k′ ∈ IOb and any b ∈ B. We will
demonstrate a body b′ satisfying wlinek(b) = wlinek′(b′).
Let ϕ(y¯, x¯) ≡ ϕ(y1, y2, y3, y4, x1, . . . , xn) be a formula such that all the free variables
y¯, x¯ of ϕ are of sort Q, and choose a¯ ∈ Qn such that
wlinek(b) ≡ {q ∈ Q4 :M  ϕ(q, a¯)},
Such ϕ and a¯ exist by wlDefM.
We define ψ ∈ Scenarios by ψ(h, x¯) ≡ (∃c)(∀q)[q ∈ wlineh(c) ↔ ϕ(q, x¯)].
Clearly, M  ψ(k, a¯). Then, by SPR+, M  ψ(k′, a¯). Thus, there is b′ ∈ B such that
wlinek′(b′) ≡ {q ∈ Q4 :M  ϕ(q, a¯)}, and wlinek(b) = wlinek′(b′) for this b′. 
Proof of Theorem 8.2. (wlDefM andM  SPR+∪{AxId, AxEv}) ⇒M  SPRB,IOb.
This is an immediate consequence of Theorems 7.5 and 8.1. 
Proof of Theorem 8.3. SPR+ ∪ {AxId, AxEv, AxWl(n)}  SPRB,IOb.
This is an immediate consequence of Theorems 7.5 and 8.4. 
Proof of Theorem 8.4. SPR(ξ) ∪ {AxWl(n)}  SPRB for some ξ .
We define ξ ∈ Scenarios by ξ(k, p1, . . . , pn) ≡ (∃b)(p1, . . . , pn ∈ wlinek(b)). It is
easy to check that ξ satisfies the theorem, and we omit the details. 
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§10. Discussion and conclusions. In this paper we have shown formally that adopting
different viewpoints can lead to different, but equally ‘natural’, formalisations of the spe-
cial principle of relativity. The idea that different formalisations exist is, of course, not
new, but the advantage of our approach is that we can investigate the formal relationships
between different formalisations, and deduce the conditions under which equivalence can
be restored.
We have shown, in particular, that the model-based interpretation of the principle,
SPRM, is strictly stronger than the alternatives SPR+ and SPRB,IOb, and have identified
various counterexamples to show that the three approaches are not, in general equivalent.
On the other hand, equivalence is restored in the presence of various axioms. We note,
however, that the following question remains open, since it is unclear whether SPR+ is
enough, in its own right, to entail SPRB,IOb.
CONJECTURE 10.1. SPR+ ⇒ SPRB.
An interesting direction for future research would be to investigate the extent to which
our existing results can be strengthened by removing auxiliary axioms. For example, our
proof that SPRM can be recovered from SPR+ currently relies on L = L0, AxId, AxIB,
AxField, AxEv, and AxExt. While we know that some additional axiom(s) must be
required (since we have presented a counterexample showing that SPR+ ⇒ SPRM),
the question remains whether we can develop a proof that works over any language, L, or
whether the constraint L = L0 is required. Again, assuming we allow the same auxiliary
axioms, how far can we minimise the set S of scenarios while still entailing the equivalence
between SPR(S) and SPRM?
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